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NOTES
Wills: Validity of No-Contest Clauses in Wills-Recently the
Missouri Supreme Court was afforded an opportunity to reconsider
the validity of "no-contest" clauses in wills. The case involved a
will which provided:
If any person or persons who are beneficiaries under this my last
Will and Testament shall at any time attempt or aid in an attempt
to oppose the administration of this will to probate or to have the
same set aside or declared invalid, then and in that event, such
beneficiary or beneficiaries shall by that act forfeit all right or
title to any part of my estate and any and all bequests I have
made to them or their descendants under this will, shall be null
and void and my estate shall be distributed in the same manner
as it would be distributed under the terms hereof if that person
or persons had died prior to my death without leaving lineal
descendants.
Testator's son, who was to receive only $100 under the will had
commenced an action to contest the will, alleging that the testator was
of unsound mind and was subjected to undue influence at the time he
signed the will. The contest was settled by payment of $5,000 to the
son from the assets of the estate.
Sometime later, when a trust established by the will was to terminate and the corpus thereof distributed, a question arose as to whether
the children of testator's son were prevented from sharing in such
distribution because of the son's violation of the "no-contest" clause.
The trustee petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking construction of the "no-contest" clause and a determination of the persons to
whom the corpus of the estate should be distributed. The lower court
found that the son had probable cause for contesting the validity of the
will but, in light of prior Missouri decisions upholding the validity of
such clauses without regard to any probable-cause exception, decided
that both the son and his children lost their rights under the will because
of the son's contest.
On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court was asked to reconsider the
doctrine set forth in its prior decisions and adopt the probable-cause
exception. After reviewing its prior holdings and the authority in support of the probable-cause exception, it decided that the arguments in
favor of the unconditional validity of this type of clause continued to
preponderate.'
When the contest, as here, is on one of the six usual grounds,
namely: forgery, subsequent revocation by later will or codicil, fraud,
undue influence, testamentary incapacity, or improper execution, there
is a definite conflict of authority on the effect to be given a "no-contest"
' Commerce Trust Company v. Weed, 318 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo. 1958).
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clause. 2 A court confronted with facts similar to those involved in
this case would most probably be forced to adopt one of three lines of
judicial decisions.3 It could: declare that a "no-contest" condition is
valid in every instance; adopt the doctrine that such a condition is valid
and enforceable if the contest is merely frivolous and vexatious, but
invalid and unenforceable where probable cause for contest is shown
and the action was prosecuted in good faith; or simply declare that
4
such a condition is unenforceable in every instance.
The doctrine that a provision in a will for the forfeiture of the share
of a beneficiary who contests the will is always valid and not contrary
to public policy appears to have originated in the English case of Cooke
v. Turner5 and is now adopted by numerous jurisdictions.8 The rea2 Although not contests within the strict meaning of the term of what can be

grounds for contest of a will in probate proceedings (see ATKINSON,
WILLS § 96 (2d ed. 1953)), when a contestant alleges that testator devised
property which he did not own the courts have consistently held the "nocontest" condition valid. Again considering that the action is technically not
a ground for contest unless specifically made so by testator, when the contestant has shown that testator has made specific dispositions in violation of
an express statute or ruling of law, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities,
the courts are equally consistent in declaring the condition invalid. See
Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1066,
1074, 1075 (1938).
3 A fourth possibility which might be utilized in a small minority of jurisdictions would be the ancient "In Terrorem" doctrine, by which a condition
subsequent providing for forfeiture in the event of contest, when imposed
on a bequest of personal property, is regarded as "in terrorem" and void unless followed by a gift over on the breach thereof. This artificial doctrine,
having its roots in 17th century English law, is not supported by any policy
considerations and is presently used, if at all, partly because it is a convenient
device for deciding a case without having to face the problem of public policy.
Currently this archiac doctrine occasionally appears as a modification of the
probable-cause rule to the effect that a "no-contest" condition will not be
enforced if the contestant had probable cause, provided there is no gift over
on breach of the condition. For a discussion of the origin and present status
of this doctrine, see Browder, supra note 2, at 1092, 1100; and Browder,
Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-examined, 49 Colum. L. Rev.
320, 338, 339 (1949) ; Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So. 2d 881 (1946).
4 Claims of representing the majority are made by proponents of both the
first and second views. CJ.S., Wills § 983 contends that the first view is

majority. See 67 A.L.R. 52, 64 (1940) and 125 A.L.R. 1135, 1136 (1940) to the

effect that the first view is minority and the probable-cause rule is majority.
Note however, that ATKINSON, WILLS § 82 (2d ed. 1953) and PAGE,
WILLS § 1306 (3d ed. 1941) do not commit themselves on which view is
majority. Latest research indicates there isa fairly even division. Browder,
supra note 3. Itmust also be noted that ruling cases inmany jurisdictions
holding with the claimed majority or minority were decided long ago and
have not had their postion re-examined in the light of contemporary concepts of public policy. States that claim to adopt the more stringent first view
often avoid its harsh effect in particular cases by way of construction to avoid
finding a breach.
5 15 M. & W. 727, 153 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1846).
GSmithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898) ; Donegan v. Wade, 70
Ala. 501 (1881) ; Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443 (1909) ; Cohen v.
Reisman, 203 Ga. 684, 48 S.E. 2d 113 (1948); Hurley v. Blankenship, 267
S.W.2d 99 (Ky. S. Ct. 1954); Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N.E. 882

(1928); Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929); Rossi v.
Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W. 2d 363 (1939); Burtman v. Butman, 97 N.H.
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sons for holding such a provision in a will valid without exception for
probable-cause are based on an interpretation of public policy. Some
courts hold that there is no public policy involved since the state has
no interest in who possesses the property in question. As stated in this
early case:
...the state has no interest whatever apart from the interest of
the parties themselves. There is no duty on the part of an heir,
whether of perfect or imperfect obligation, to contest his ancestor's sanity. It matters not to the state whether the land is enjoyed by the heir or the devisee; and we conceive, therefore, that
the law leaves the parties to make just what contracts and
what arrangements they may think expedient as to the raising or
not raising questions of law or fact among one another, the sole
result of which is to give the enjoyment of property to one
claimant rather than another. 7
In answer to this argument that the state has no interest in whether
the heir or the devisee enjoys the use of the land, Chancellor Wardlaw
of South Carolina stated:
It seems to me that this is a very narrow view of public policy.
It is the interest of the state that every legal owner should enjoy
his estate, and that no citizen should be obstructed by the risk of
forfeiture from ascertaining his rights by the law of the land. It
may be politic to encourage parties in the adjustment of doubtful
rights by arbitration or by private settlement; but it is against
the fundamental principles of justice and policy to inhibit a party
from ascertaining his rights by appeal to the tribunals established by the state to settle and determine conflicting claims. If
there be any such thing as public policy, it must embrace the
right of a citizen to have his claims determined by law."
In the later case of Rudd v. Searles9 the Massachusetts court found
that there was a public policy issue involved in enforcing this type of
clause in that the state is definitely concerned with discouraging unmeritorious litigation. 1° The Massachusetts court reminds the contestant
that such a condition does not deprive him of his right to have a judicial determination of his contest. Thus in its decision the court states:
... the prohibition [against contesting] cannot be absolute, and
can be invoked only where the validity of a will has been unsuc254, 85 A. 2d 892 (1952)

(semble); Alper v. Alper, 2 N.J. 105, 65 A. 2d 737

(1949) ; Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 168 N.E. 574 (1929) ; Whitmore
v. Smith, 94 Okla. 90, 221 Pac. 775 (1923) (dictum); Massie v. Massie, 54
Tex. Civ. App. 617, 118 S.W. 219 (1909); Barry v. American Security and
Trust Co., 135 F. 2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522,
95 S.E. 2d 213 (1956); Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 120 A. 2d 815 (1956). See
also Comment, 45 Geo. L.J. 200 (1956-57); and Comment, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev.
762, 763 (1957).
Supra note 5 at 1047.
s Mallet v. Smith, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich) 12, 60 Am. Dec. 107, 109 (1853).
9 Rudd v. Searles, supra note 6.
10 Also see ATKINSON, supra note 2, at §82, page 409.
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cessfully contested. If there be a clear and patent defect in the
formalities attending the execution of the instrument, or if the
incapacity of the alleged testator be clear and notorious, the
heirs or other parties interested will . . . contest the will, and,

contesting it successfully, will set it aside with the clause of forfeiture.... Such a clause does not prevent a contest by the beneficiary under the will.... The beneficiary has the option, either
to receive the gift under the will, or undertake a contest of the
will. He can exercise his election."'
If the legatee chooses to contest and loses, he shows that his cause was
unmeritorious 1 2 and he should be penalized in accordance with the will

for wasting the court's time and the deceased's estate, such action being
in derogation of what this court interprets to be the public policy.
The basis for the above interpretation of public policy by the courts
may be that many will contests, being the result of dissatisfaction, have
no foundation or are brought in the hope of securing a more favorable
compromise settlement. When such an action is prosecuted, family
dissension results and family secrets which should never be disclosed
are made public. In interpreting public policy to impose a penalty on
unmeritorious litigation in these cases, the courts are allowing the
testator to freely dispose of his property in such a way as to prevent
intra-family hostility after his decease without depriving a contestant
of his right to a judicial determination of his claim. The evils which
can result from unfounded litigation are cogently expounded in the
following quotation:
Public and private benefits may flow from the operation of such
a clause. Contests over the allowance of wills, frequently, if not
invariably, result in minute examination into the habits, manners,
beliefs, conduct, idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and
personal affairs of the testator, when he is not alive and cannot
explain what may without explanation be given a sinister appearance. To most persons such exposure to publicity of their own
personality is distasteful, if not abhorrent. The ease with which
plausible contentions as to mental unsoundness may be supported
by some evidence is also a factor which well may be in the mind
of a testator in determining to insert such a clause in his will.
Nothing in the law or in public policy ...requires the denial of
solace of that nature to one making a will. A will contest not
infrequently engenders animosities and arouses hostilities among
the kinsfolk of the testator, which may never be put to rest and
which contribute to general unhappiness. Moreover, suspicions
or beliefs in personal insanity, mental weakness, eccentricities,
pernicious habits, other odd characteristics centering or radiating
from the testator may bring his family into evil repute and ad11 Rudd v .Searles, supra note 6, at 499; 160 N.E. at 886.
12

It is important not to equate "unsuccessful contest" with "unmeritorious contest" in every case. Rules of evidence may, for example, prevent a person
with a de facto meritorious cause from prevailing in a trial because the contest may be partially grounded on evidence inadmissable in court.
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versely affect the standing in the community of its members.
contest may bring sorrow and suffering to many
Thus a will
13
concerned.
It is important to note that the Missouri Court in the instant case
expressly relies on the reasoning of its prior decisions in In Re Chambers' Estate14 and in Rossi v. Davis'5 wherein the above reasoning and
quotations form a substantial basis for the results there reached. The
Missouri Court recognizes "that the view that the forfeiture provisions
should not be enforced where probable cause exists is supported by
logical reason and respectable authority" 6 but prefers to rely on its
reasoning in the Chambers17 and Rossi"" cases to enforce such a clause
without regard to any such exception based upon the good faith and
probable cause of the contestant.
Jurisdictions which recognize such an exception are numerous, 19 but
whether the exception will be applied in the instant case may vary
depending on whether the liberal view or the more restrictive Restatement position is adopted.
The majority of states recognizing this exception adopt the liberal
position and, like the states which believe such a condition should be
enforced without exception, also base their decision on an interpretation of public policy. Thus the "no-contest" clause is declared to be
contrary to public policy and inoperative when the contest was made in
good faith and on probable clause, whether the contest was for fraud,
undue influence, testamentary incapacity, improper execution, forgery,
or subsequent revocation by a later will or codicil.
While supporters of the unconditional validity doctrine base their
position on an absence of public policy or on the public policy favoring
prevention of unmeritorious litigation, advocates of the probable-cause
13 Rudd v. Searles, supra note 6, at 499; 160 N.E. at 886.

14332 Mo. 1086, 18 S.W. 2d 30, 67 A.L.R. 41 (1929).

15 Rossi v. Davis, supra note 6.
16 Supra note 1, at 289, 301.
17 In re Estate of Chambers, supra note 14.
IS Rossi v. Davis, supra note 6 .
19 South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Atl. 961 (1917)
Wells v. Menn, supra note 3 (semble); In re Estate of Cocklin, 236 Iowa 98,
17 N.W. 2d 129 (1945); Wright v. Cummings, 108 Kan. 667, 196 Pac. 246
(1921) (dictum); In re Estate of Hartz, 247 Minn. 362, 77 N.W. 2d 169
(1956) ; In re Smyth's Estate, 271 N.Y. 623, 3 N.E. 2d 453 (1936) ; Ryan v.
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 235 N.C. 585, 70 S.E. 2d 853 (1952) ; Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 428, 259 Pac. 299 (1928), af'jd on rehearing: 125
Ore. 458, 266 Pac. 875 (1928) ; In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853
(1904) ; Rouse v. Branch, 91 S.C. 111, 74 S.E. 133 (1911) ; Tate v. Camp, 147
Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922); Estate of Chappel, 127 Wash. 638, 221 Pac.
336 (1923) ; Dutterer v. Logan, 103 W. Va. 216, 137 S.E. 1 (1927) ; Will of
Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex.
204, 55 S.W. 2d 527 (1932); First Methodist Episcopal Church South v.
Anderson, 110 S.W. 2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Hodge v. Ellis, 268
S.W. 2d S 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). See also 157 A.L.R. 596 (1945).
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exception emphasize the public interest in preventing fraud and imposition in the making and probate of wills.
In every jurisdiction there are safeguards placed on the execution
of a testator's will which usually require that he be competent, free
from imposition by others, and that certain formal requirements be
complied with. Insuring compliance with these safeguards, which were
imposed by the people through their legislature, must, in the opinion of
the states recognizing this exception, take precedence over testator's
freedom to dispose of his property with whatever conditions that he
desires. Admitting that no question of forfeiture arises until a beneficiary has contested the will and failed, thus demonstrating that the
will was valid, and that there usually is no duty to contest, nevertheless
a beneficiary cannot be certain of the strength of his or his opponent's
case when factual issues predominate. To permit a threat of forfeiture
to increase the ordinary risks of litigation based on probable cause
would result in suppression of facts which the public, through its courts,
should be aware of to prevent fraud and non-compliance with statutes.
The Connecticut Supreme Court supported this exception in the
following language:
Courts cannot know whether a will, good on its face, was made
in conformity to statutory requirements, whether the testator
was of sound mind, and whether the will was the product of undue influence, unless these matters are presented in court; and
those only who have an interest in the will, will have the disposition to lay the facts before the court. If they are forced to
remain silent, upon penalty or forfeiture of a legacy or devise
given them by the will, the court will be prevented by the command of the testator from ascertaining the truth; and the devolution of property will be had in a manner against both statutory
and common law. Courts exist to ascertain the truth and apply
the law to it in any given situation; and a right of devolution
which enables the testator to shut the door of truth
20 and prevent
observance of the law, is a mistaken public policy.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Will of Keenan,21 after quoting
the Wisconsin Constitution 22 which guarantees free and prompt legal
remedies for recognized wrongs, asks the following questions: "Is it
not against public policy to permit one person to deprive another from
asserting his rights in court? And especially so before it is ascertained
that the prohibition against contest is in fact that of the testator and not
that of one exercising undue influence over him, or that he was mentally
competent to inake it ?123 Some states answer these questions in the
negative. Jurisdictions such as Wisconsin, which recognize the unqual20 South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, supra note 19, at 175.
21 Will
22 Wis.
23 Will

of Keenan, supra note 19.
Const. art. I, §9.
of Keenan, mipra note 19, at 176.
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24
ified application of the probable-cause exception, answer affirmatively.
The jurisdictions which adopt the Restatement position give a qualified
affirmative answer.
The American Law Institute has endorsed the probable-cause exception only in cases where contest is made on the ground of forgery or

subsequent revocation by a later will or codicil,2 5 or where a particular

provision of the will is claimed to violate some express restriction on
property disposition, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities, the rules
against restraints on alienation, accumulations, restraints on marriage,
or other conditions designed to influence conduct illegally, or a mortmain statute limiting dispositions to charitable institutions. 6 In cases
involving a contest based on fraud, undue influence, improper execution, or lack of testamentary capacity the Institute contends that the
balance of social policy is normally in favor of validity of the forfeiture clause since it prevents waste of the estate and reduces the possibility of besmirching testator's reputation in actions most easily premised upon issues involving uncertain states of fact. The Institute
points out that the right to litigate remains with a dissatisfied devisee
or legatee in all cases, but in the event of failure to prevail in these last
four areas the forfeiture clause should be operative. It should be noted
here that if the Restatement view were applied by the Missouri Court
in this case the result would be identical since probable cause would
be of no concern to the court in a contest founded on undue influence
or testamentary incapacity.
However, when a contest based upon a claim of subsequent revocation is unsuccessfully prosecuted in good faith and on probable cause
the public has an "interest in having all the documents believed to repre2 7
sent a decedent's disposition of his property presented to the court"
and the forfeiture should not be enforced. Similarly, because the public has an interest in discovering the crime of forgery, an unsuccessful
contest on this ground would not cause a forfeiture under this rule.
The Institute claims that contests on these two grounds are based upon
evidence "far more definite in character than the shadowy lines of
demarcation involved in mental capacity, undue influence or fraud" '
and do not normally involve the reputation of the testator.
24

In Will of Keenan, supra note 19, the court also referred to the Wisconsin
rule that the probate of a will is a proceeding in rent and involved a consideration of publc welfare. The court stated that sound public policy dictated
that the truth of a disputable claim shall be ascertained as the law provides;
that since courts are instituted to administer justice in the state, there

should be no penalty attached to the performance of that function and
inquiry should not be prevented by penalties when there is probable cause
to contest.
25 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §428 (1944).
26d. at §429 (2).
7 Id. at §428, p. 2501.
281d. at 2502.
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The Restatement's piecemeal acceptance of the probable-cause concept is criticized by Olin L. Browder, Jr.29 as follows:
Although it may be a crime to forge a will, but not to coerce or
defraud a testator into making one, and although there may be a
duty to produce for probate anything believed to be a true will,
but no duty to contest a testator's sanity, it does not follow that
there is less public interest in preventing probate of a fraudulent
will than a forged one, or of an insane man's will than one which
he has revoked by a later will.3o
judge Miller, in his dissent in Barry v. American Security and
Trust Company,31 stated: "What real difference does it make whether
a man cleverly imitates the signature of a testator or stands over him
with a club and compels him to sign ?"
Mr. Browder,3 2 adverting to the Restatement's argument that proof
of forgery is based on evidence of a more definite character than that
used in proving fraud or undue influence, believes that such language
is argument for, not against, enforcement of "no-contest" clauses in
such case. As he states: ". . . the more definite the proof, the more
rapidly can a contestant evaluate the merit of his case, and the less
pressing is the need that, in the public interest, he be relieved from
threat of forfeiture. 33
Judge Miller's dissenting opinion3 4 maintains that a person with
sufficient funds to hire counsel and risk a contest is the one who is least
likely to be dissuaded from contesting by threat or forfeiture. It is "the
poor, the timid, the children, women, and incompetents", who will be
restrained; those whose right to contest a will public policy should be
most concerned in protecting.3 5
The Restatement's endorsement of the probable-cause rule for contests involving some express social restriction is almost universally
accepted and appears sound since the issues involved are not primarily
factual, but depend upon the application of intricate legal rules or variable social policies where the beneficiary should not be forced to bear
the risk of correctly anticipating the ultimate legal determination.
Finally, there is the possibility that a court would declare such a
condition invalid in every case, regardless of whether the contest was
instituted in good faith and on probable cause. Indiana invalidates all
conditions for forfeiture upon contest by statute 36 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, after denying forfeiture because there was probable
29 Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-examined, supra note 3.
30Id. at 330.
31 Supra note 6.
32 Browder, Testamentary ConditionsAgainst Contest Re-examined, supra note 3.
3 Id. at 330, 331.
34

Barry v. American Security and Trust Co., supra note 6.
35
Id. at 473.
36
Ind. Stat. Ann., §6-602 (Bums 1953). Compare with N. Y. Dec. Estate Law
§126 (1946).
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cause for the contest, left open the possibility of declaring all such
conditions to be contrary to public policy and invalid by expressly refusing to decide the issue of the validity of these conditions in cases
37
where there is no probable cause for the contest.
It is this writer's opinion that to so remove all effectiveness from
"no-contest" conditions by statute or decision would be to create too
great an incentive for dissatisfied heirs, or devisees and legatees under
a prior will, to commence vexatious suits based on little or no credible
evidence. However, at the other extreme, to declare such a condition to
always be valid would stifle bona fide contests by greatly increasing the
risks of litigation. Jurisdictions which enforce this type of condition
without any probable-cause exception should consider the effect of such
action if the condition were to become a standard clause in all wills.
The Restatement position would seem to create an unwarranted and
artificial distinction between the various grounds for contest. The
liberal probable-cause doctrine appears to be the most satisfactory for
a court to adopt if the court ".

.

. in applying the probable-cause rule

is alert to exact full compliance with a testator's wishes from a contestant who can show no just cause for his contest, resolving all doubts
in that matter against him." 3 Adoption of this doctrine allows the
testator reasonable freedom to dispose of his property as he wishes, 39
provides safeguards against vexatious litigation, insures compliance
with statutory provisions for testamentary documents, and does not
unduly increase the risk of litigating a primarily factual matter when
done in good faith and on probable cause.
ROBERT

E.

KUELTHAU

Will of Keenan, supra note 19, at 179.
38 Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-examined, supra note
3, at 331.
39Wisconsin, seemingly being a minority of one, takes the position that the
right to make a will disposing of property upon death is a most important
right [In re Szperka's Will, 254 Wis. 153, 157, 35 N.W. 2d 209, 210 (1948)],
one which is absolute [Will of Ball, 153 Wis. 27, 31, 141 N.W. 8, 10 (1913)],
sacred [(Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 445, 446, 136 N.W. 956, 973, 137
N.W. 778 (1912)]; In re Mills, 250 Wis. 401, 27 N.W. 2d 375 (1947);
In re Agg's Estate, 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W. 2d 175 (1952)], inherent. (Will
of Rice, supra) ; a "natural" right [Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190,
108 N.W. 627, 9 L.R.A., N.S. 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711 (1906)], subject only to
reasonable regulation [In re Uihlein's Estate, 269 Wis. 170, 68 N.W. 2d
816 (1955)], not abrogation, by governmental action or judicial decision. It
would seem that, in the light of the other limitations accepted as reasonable
restraints on the right of a person to dispose of his property by will, the
equitable aspect of the probable-cause rule, and the infrequency of litigation
on this issue, the Wisconsin court would not regard the application of the
probable-cause rule as an unreasonable restraint upon the "natural" right of
persons to dispose of property by will.
37

